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Articles
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards in Rhode Island
William E. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the current state of judicial review of
labor arbitration awards, with a special emphasis on recent case
law emerging from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The focus of
this Article is judicial review of arbitration awards; however, with
the increasing use of arbitration as a dispute-resolution mecha-
nism, the experience in the labor-arbitration field may have rele-
vance to other areas of law which increasingly utilize arbitration.
A review of the federal case law in the labor-arbitration field
indicates a continuing application of a deferential standard of re-
view first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court over
thirty years ago. The First Circuit, however, has demonstrated a
willingness to vacate awards which violate public policy. By con-
trast, recent decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court indicate
a more aggressive approach to the review of arbitration awards.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court appears to be engaged in an ef-
fort to reign in arbitrators who exceed their authority under collec-
tive bargaining agreements. While it still gives substantial
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deference to arbitration awards, the court has indicated an in-
creasing willingness to examine carefully awards of arbitrators
and overturn them in appropriate circumstances. With these re-
cent decisions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has significantly
altered the playing field with respect to judicial review of labor ar-
bitration awards. The long-term impact of these rulings will be
significant in terms of the authority of arbitrators to interpret
terms of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, as
well as the role of the courts in overseeing this function.
Part II of this Article will first address several procedural is-
sues which a practitioner must be aware of in bringing a motion to
vacate or overturn an arbitration award. Second, Part III will turn
to the substantive law in the area, looking first at the federal deci-
sional law and then to the law, both statutory and decisional, of
Rhode Island. Finally, in conclusion, Part IV of the Article will
provide some opinions and suggestions on the future developments
of the law and practice in this field.
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Before discussing the law surrounding the judicial review of
labor arbitration awards in substance, a number of important pro-
cedural issues exist which an attorney should recognize before
moving to vacate or overturn an arbitration award.'
First, it is important to understand that parties may bring ac-
tions to vacate or overturn arbitration awards in either federal or
state court,2 depending upon whether the collective-bargaining re-
lationship is governed by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)3 or the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act.4 Gener-
ally speaking, private-sector labor contracts are governed by the
NLRA, which vests jurisdiction in the federal courts under section
1. The scope of this Article does not include issues of "procedural arbi-
trability" under either federal, state or arbitral law. Rhode Island law provides the
statutory framework for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under state law.
See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9-1 to -26 (1956) (1995 Reenactment). For general infor-
mation on the procedural arbitrability issue, see Frank Elkouri & Edna Aspen
Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (BNA 4th ed. 1985).
2. This Article places special emphasis on Rhode Island labor-arbitration
law. As such, any reference to "state law" and/or "state courts" indicate a reference
to Rhode Island state law and/or Rhode Island state courts.
3. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-85 (West 1973 & Supp. 1997).
4. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-7-1 to -46 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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301.5 However, an action to vacate an award resulting from a con-
tract covered by the NLRA may be brought in state court;6 none-
theless, it is likely that such an action would be removed to federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 7 Public-sector contracts, by con-
trast, are governed solely by state law, and parties may bring ac-
tions to vacate arbitration awards in the public sector only in state
court.8
A. Motions to Vacate
A challenge to an arbitration award is made in the form of a
motion to vacate when brought in state court. Typically, the losing
party at arbitration files a motion to vacate, and in most cases the
prevailing party will file a motion to confirm the award. Occasion-
ally, a prevailing party will file a motion to confirm an arbitration
award where no motion to vacate has been filed in order to ensure
that the award has more enforceability in the future. The obvious
reason for obtaining a confirmation order from the court is to gain
a vehicle for enforcement if the losing party fails to comply. Sec-
tion 28-9-21 of the Rhode Island General Laws establishes the time
5. Originally, the state labor relations act was designed to apply to both pri-
vate- and public-sector labor relations. However, with the passage of the NLRA in
1939, Congress preempted the field with respect to companies engaged in inter-
state commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(7), (8) (1994); see, e.g., Nash v. Florida Indus.
Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,238 (1967) ("The [NLRAJ is a comprehensive code passed by
Congress to regulate labor relations in activities affecting interstate and foreign
commerce. As such it is of course the law of the land which no state law can modify
or repeal."); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (hold-
ing that states are prohibited from regulating activities that are within the pur-
view of the NLRA).
6. See Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962)
(holding that under § 301, "the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal
district courts was not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered
jurisdiction of the courts of the various States over contracts made by labor
organizations").
7. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1 (1983); Exquisito Servs., Inc. v. Bartenders, Motel, Hotel and Restaurant Work-
ers Local Union No. 222, 579 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
8. The NLRA specifically exempts state and local government labor contracts
from its coverage. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2) (West 1973 & Supp. 1997); see also Chap-
parro-Febus v. International Longshoremen Ass'n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325, 329
(1st Cir. 1992) (defining the term "political subdivision" as it is used in 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 152(2)).
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frame and the procedure for filing a motion to vacate.9 Section 28-
9-21 provides:
Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award
must be served upon the adverse party, or his attorney,
within three (3) months after the award is filed or delivered,
as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion upon an
attorney in an action; except that in opposition to a motion to
confirm an award, any of the grounds specified in § 28-9-18
may be set up. For the purpose of the motion, any judge who
might make an order to stay the proceedings in an action
brought in the same court may make an order, to be served
with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the ad-
verse party to enforce the award.' 0
In federal court, an action to vacate the award is brought as an
action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA)." Jurisdiction may also exist pursuant to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (FAA).' 2 While the FAA does not apply to "contracts
of employment of workers.. . engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce,"' 3 the federal courts have taken varying views on its appli-
cability to labor arbitration awards, which necessarily arise under
labor contracts. 14
Labor contracts are clearly "contracts for employment." The
United States Supreme Court, in United Paperworkers Interna-
tional Union v. Misco, Inc.,'15 seems to have clarified this conclu-
sion when it acknowledged that federal courts have looked to the
LMRA as guidance in reviewing labor arbitration awards under
section 301. The Court then proceeded to refer to the LMRA in
analyzing the case before it.16 There is no statute of limitations
contained in section 301. Courts have disagreed as to the appro-
priate limitations period to be "borrowed" in these actions. Several
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-21 (1956).
10. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
13. Id. at § 1.
14. Compare Hotels Condado Beach, La Concha and Convention Ctr. v. Union
de Tronquistar Local 901, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying the FAA in the
labor context) and Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516 Int'l Union, UAW, 500 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1974) (same), with Sine v. Local No. 992, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 644 F.2d
997 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (holding that the FAA does
not apply to labor contracts that are contracts of employment).
15. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
16. See id. at 40 n.9.
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circuit courts have borrowed the three-month limitation period
provided in the FAA.17
B. Motions to Stay
In order to bring a motion to vacate an arbitration award in a
Rhode Island state court, the moving party must either comply
with the arbitrator's award pending the motion to vacate or move
the court for a stay of the arbitration award pending consideration
of the motion to vacate.1 s Generally, but not in all cases, the
Rhode Island Superior Court will grant the motion to stay the
award. This is particularly true in cases which require the pay-
ment of monies or other significant steps by the employer which
would be difficult, if not impossible, to undo once the remedy is
implemented.
C. Attorney Fees
If the moving party loses a motion to vacate brought in state
court pursuant to section 28-9-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
then that party must pay the attorney fees of the prevailing
party.19 By contrast, actions to vacate arbitration awards brought
in federal court under section 301 are not subject to a similar
"loser-pays" provision. Federal courts may award attorney fees
where they find that the action is frivolous or brought in bad faith
to harass the other party.20 Parties to an action in federal court
may also be liable for fees under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.21 Of course, the standard under Rule 11, while it
17. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 33 v. Power
City Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 934 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1991) ("borrowing" the
three-month limitation period where no state-law analogue is present). Similar to
the FAA, the limitations period in Rhode Island is three months. See R.I. Gen.
Laws § 28-9-21.
18. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18(b).
19. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9-18(c).
20. See generally Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indust.
Workers of Am., 959 F.2d 685, 689-90 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to award
attorney fees when the court found that the action was not frivolous); Miller Brew-
ing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1167-68 (7th Cir.
1984) (same).
21. See Chicago Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Chicago Web Printing Press-
men's Union No. 7, 821 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Local Union 879
Allied Indus. Workers of Am. v. Chrysler Marine Corp., 819 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir.
1987) (stating that Rule 11 requires an objective test and a showing of bad faith is
not essential).
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does not require a showing of bad faith, does present a significant
hurdle to any prevailing party seeking attorney fees.
D. Finality
In order for an award to be ripe for review by a court, it must
be a final award. An arbitration award is final only if the arbitra-
tor intends that the award be a complete determination of every
issue submitted. 22 An arbitration award is not final when an arbi-
trator retains jurisdiction so that he may decide a substantive is-
sue that the parties have not resolved. 23 In a recent case decided
by the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, the court stated:
As a general matter, federal courts decline to review an arbi-
trator's decision under section 301 of the LMRA until the
award is final. "To be considered 'final,' an arbitration award
must be intended by the arbitrator to be a complete determi-
nation of every issue submitted...." "Where an arbitrator
retains jurisdiction in order to decide a substantive issue the
parties have not yet resolved, this retention of jurisdiction 'in-
dicates that the arbitrator did not intend the award to be fi-
nal.'" As with the finality doctrine governing appeals from
district court orders, this "complete arbitration rule" pre-
serves judicial resources by preventing piecemeal litigation.24
An arbitration award cannot be considered final if a determi-
nation of damages requires the taking of evidence to resolve signif-
icant issues.25 When an arbitrator retains jurisdiction over a
remedy, his award is final only if determination of the remedy
amounts to mere ministerial detail.26
22. See Millmen Local 550, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v.
Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1985)).
23. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., 946 F.2d 722,
724 (9th Cir. 1991).
24. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers,
Shopmen's Local Union 501 v. Burtman Iron Works, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D.
Mass. 1996) (citations omitted).
25. See Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Ass'n v. Pevely Sheet Metal Co.,
951 F.2d 947, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the award was not final and that
the statute of limitations for filing the motion to confirm did not begin running
until the arbitrator issued an order determining damages).
26. See id. at 949 (citing Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 802 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The substantive law of judicial review of arbitration awards
starts with federal decisional law, beginning with the early cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court. These early cases
remain, to this day, the foundation of the law in this area. In re-
viewing the federal decisions in this Part, particular focus is given
to recent decisions of the First Circuit and United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island. The second section of this
Part deals with the statutory and decisional law of Rhode Island
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court, respectively. This section
includes a brief review of the court's early decisions, but focuses
largely on several recent decisions which suggest an important
shift in the court's approach to the review of arbitration awards.
Finally, this Part provides a discussion of several pending cases,
legislative efforts to reverse some of the court's recent holdings and
some commentary from the author.
A. Federal Decisional Law and Standards of Review
1. The United States Supreme Court: From the Steelworkers
Trilogy to Misco and the Policy of Judicial Deference
to Arbitration
Any analysis of the federal standard of judicial review of arbi-
tration awards necessarily begins with three cases-United Steel-
workers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.,27 United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 28 and
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.29
These three cases, decided on the same day and known collectively
as the Steelworkers Trilogy (Trilogy), set forth the general stan-
dard of review for cases brought in United States district courts
pursuant to section 301(a) of the LMRA.30 Although later cases
27. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
28. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
29. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
30. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1988), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citi-
zenship of the parties.
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prescribe the application of this general standard, the deferential
standard of review contained in the Trilogy remains the bench-
mark for judicial review of arbitral decisions. 3 '
In United Steelworkers of America u. American Manufacturing
Co.,32 the Court confronted, among other issues, the question of
the arbitrability of a grievance that the union filed against the
company.33 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment on the grounds that the union's griev-
ance was "a frivolous, patently baseless one, not subject to arbitra-
tion under the collective bargaining agreement."34 Reversing the
Sixth Circuit, the Court concluded that the LMRA embraced a pol-
icy favoring the dispute-resolution mechanism chosen by the par-
ties.35 In rejecting the analysis employed by the court of appeals,
Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion, stated:
The collective agreement calls for the submission of griev-
ances in the categories which it describes, irrespective of
whether a court may deem them to be meritorious .... The
function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to
the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the
party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face
is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is
right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the
arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should
not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his
judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.36
Id.
31. See, e.g., El Mundo Broading. Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 116
F.3d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (stating that generally, arbitration awards are not
subject to judicial review)).
32. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
33. See id. at 566.
34. Id. at 566 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 264
F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959)).
35. See id. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1988), states in pertinent part that "final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing col-
lective-bargaining agreement...." Id. (quoting Section 203(d) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988)).
36. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
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In the second Trilogy case, United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,3 7 the Court, again speaking
through Justice Douglas, expanded the scope of the arbitrator's
power to interpret the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.38 The Court stated:
Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of
the questions on which the parties disagree must therefore
come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions of the collective agreement. ... The labor arbitrator per-
forms functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed
be foreign to the competence of the courts.... The labor arbi-
trator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions
of the contract, as the industrial common law - the practices
of the industry and the shop - is equally a part of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement although not expressed in it. The
labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' con-
fidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear consider-
ations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment.... The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence to bear upon the deter-
mination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed. 39
Having concluded that the arbitrator's power to interpret the
contract and the disputes arising from the contract was plenary,
the Court went on to establish a corresponding standard of review
in the final installment of the Trilogy. In this final installment,
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,4°
the Court addressed the issue of whether it is appropriate for a
federal court to review the merits of an arbitrator's award pursu-
ant to a collective bargaining agreement between the parties.41
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held
that the arbitrator's award was unenforceable because it was both
indefinite and beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agree-
37. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 581-82.
40. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
41. See id.
1998]
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ment.42 Emphasizing that the "federal policy of settling labor dis-
putes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final
say on the merits of [arbitrator's] awards,"43 Justice Douglas pro-
pounded a deferential standard of review for purposes of the
LMRA.
Drawing on principles articulated in the Court's prior two rul-
ings, the majority stated:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply
the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his in-
formed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution to
the problem. This is especially true when it comes to formu-
lating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a
wide variety of situations .... Nevertheless, an arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for gui-
dance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidel-
ity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse en-
forcement of the award. 44
The Court went on to hold that courts must be deferential to
arbitrators' holdings, stating that "Itihe refusal of courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbi-
tration under collective bargaining agreements." 45 Moreover, the
Court noted that a reviewing court may not overturn an arbitra-
tor's award simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's con-
struction of the collective bargaining agreement.46 The parties
bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement, and
thus, the "courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator]" sim-
ply because they might arrive at a different interpretation of the
contractual language. 47
42. See id. at 595-96. The court of appeals held that the arbitrator's failure to
specify the amount of certain back payments rendered the award unenforceable.
Moreover, the court of appeals found that the expiration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement precluded the arbitrator from requiring the company to reinstate
employees as part of the remedy in the case. See id. at 596.
43. Id. at 596.
44. Id. at 597.
45. Id. at 596.
46. See id. at 599.
47. Id.
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The Trilogy, and in particular the holding of Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., set forth the Court's early statement favoring judicial
deference to arbitration awards, except in cases where the award
does not "draw its essence" from the parties' agreement.
The question of whether an arbitration award draws its es-
sence from the labor contract has been the source of considerable
litigation over the years since the Trilogy. As the years passed, the
Court recognized that judicial deference should not be unlimited.
In the 1980s, the Court appeared to recognize the need for review-
ing courts to scrutinize arbitration awards in order to ensure that
the awards remained within the bounds of the contract, the law
and public policy. In 1987, the Court dealt specifically with a pub-
lic-policy "exception" to judicial deference. In W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local Union 759,48 an employer laid off various male employees
pursuant to a conciliation agreement that it had reached with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).49 The af-
fected employees immediately filed grievances against the com-
pany, and, after protracted legal proceedings, the court of appeals
forced the company to arbitrate the grievances.50 At the arbitra-
tion, the company acknowledged that it had violated various sen-
iority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement, but
argued that it had done so in a good faith effort to comply with the
conciliation agreement it had reached with the EEOC.51
During the course of the proceedings between the company
and the union, the district court entered an order affirming the
company's duty to comply with the conciliation agreement.5 2 In
spite of the conciliation agreement, the arbitrator found that the
company had violated the seniority provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and issued an award in the union's favor. The
district court vacated the award as contrary to public policy, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.5 3
48. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
49. See id. at 759-61.
50. See id. at 761-62.
51. See id. at 763. The conciliation agreement required the company to main-
tain a certain proportion of women as members of the plant's bargaining unit. The
displaced male workers filed grievances claiming that the company had violated
the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement notwithstanding
the conciliation agreement. See id. at 760-61.
52. See id. at 761.
53. See id. at 763-64.
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After restating the standard of review set forth in the Trilogy,
the Court proceeded to the argument that the arbitrator's award
subverted well-established public policies. The Court stated:
As with any contract,... a court may not enforce a collective-
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy....
Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and domi-
nant, and is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup-
posed public interests."54
First, the Court addressed the important public policy of obe-
dience to judicial orders.55 Noting that the policy was an impor-
tant one, the Court nevertheless refused to overturn the
arbitrator's award because the company's desire to reduce its work
force was the sole reason that the company decided to abide by the
conciliation agreement and to ignore the collective bargaining
agreement.56 Given this choice by the company and the "sufficient
contempt powers"57 of the district court to ensure compliance with
its injunctions, 8 the Court refused to vacate the award on this
public-policy ground.
Second, the Court dismissed the contention that the arbitra-
tor's award violated a public policy favoring voluntary compliance
with Title VII.59 The Court reasoned that a decision to vacate the
arbitrator's award might actually encourage the contracting par-
ties to use Title VII conciliation agreements to escape their obliga-
tions under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.6 0 The
Court stated that "[plermitting such a result would undermine the
federal labor law policy that parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement must have reasonable assurance that their contract will
54. Id. at 766 (citations omitted) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324
U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 767.
57. Id. at 769.
58. The Court's opinion notes that the district court's order might have re-
sulted only in a declaratory judgment against the company, and not a mandatory
injunction against actions that violated the conciliation agreement. For purposes
of the decision, the Court assumed that the latter set of circumstances was true.
See id. at 768 n.11.
59. See id. at 771.
60. See id.
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be honored."6 1 After W.R. Grace & Co., it appeared that the public-
policy exception was limited, indeed.
Four years later in 1987, the Court clarified its dicta from
W.R. Grace & Co. In United Paperworkers International Union v.
Misco, Inc.,62 the Court refined its definition of the "well defined
and dominant public policy" that would justify a reviewing court's
decision to vacate an arbitrator's award.63
In Misco, an employee, whose job involved the operation of
dangerous equipment, was apprehended in a car filled with mari-
juana smoke. The car, which did not belong to the employee, was
located on company grounds. The police recovered plastic scales
and marijuana gleanings during a subsequent search of the em-
ployee's automobile. Without knowledge that the police had
searched the employee's car, the company discharged the employee
for violating a company rule prohibiting the posssession of drugs
on company premises. The employee filed a grievance to protest
the discharge. 64
Finding that the company had failed to prove that the em-
ployee used or possessed marijuana on company premises, the ar-
bitrator upheld the grievance and ordered the company to
reinstate the employee with back pay and full seniority status.65
The district court vacated the award on public-policy grounds and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed,66 noting that the award violated the pol-
icy "against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons
under the influence of drugs or alcohol."67 The United States
Supreme Court reversed.68
The Supreme Court agreed to review the court of appeals' deci-
sion on the question of whether an arbitrator's award may be re-
versed by a court on public-policy grounds only when the award
violates positive law. However, the Court did not definitively de-
61. Id. (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962)).
62. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
63. Id. at 43-44 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766 ("[I]f the contract
... violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it.
Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant... .") (citation
omitted)).
64. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 33.
65. See id. at 33-34.
66. See id. at 35.
67. Id. at 35 (quoting Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d
739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985)).
68. See id. at 45.
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cide this issue, but rather reversed the court of appeals on other
grounds. The Court held that the lower courts exceeded their au-
thority by disregarding the arbitrator's findings of fact with regard
to whether the incident violated the employer's rules and by reach-
ing their own findings with respect to the evidence in the arbitra-
tion regarding to the marijuana found in the grievant's car.69
After a general recitation of the standards set forth in the Tril-
ogy, the Court reached the public-policy argument. The Court pro-
ceeded to restrict the W.R. Grace & Co. decision to those instances
where a clear violation of an explicit public policy had occurred. 70
In the Court's opinion, W.R. Grace & Co. did not sanction a com-
prehensive judicial power to reject arbitration awards as against
public policy, 71 but rather restricted public-policy review to those
awards that were contrary to other laws and legal precedents. 72
The Court held that, "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contact and acting within the scope of
his authority, that a court is convinced it committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision."73 Since the court of ap-
peals grounded its decision only in general considerations of public
policy, its ruling was inconsistent with both the holding in W.R.
Grace & Co. and the findings of the arbitrator. 74 The Supreme
Court therefore reversed.75
It is not surprising, therefore, that many commentators have
argued strenuously in the years since the Trilogy for continued def-
erence to arbitration awards. 76 Nevertheless, in spite of the gen-
69. See id. at 3942.
70. See id. at 43 (citing W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766) (quoting Mus-
chaney v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id. at 44-45.
75. See id. at 45. It is important to note that the Court's opinion does not
define whether a reviewing court's power to vacate an arbitrator's award arises
only in those circumstances where public policy has been expressed as a positive
law. Justice Blackmun suggests that satisfaction of the W.R. Grace criteria is a
necessary element of any decision to vacate an arbitral award, but it may not be
sufficient grounds for doing so. See id. at 47-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. See David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Gold Age, in Arbitra-
tion 1976: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators 97, 107 (1976) (stating that deference to arbitral awards is a
result of "recognition that arbitration is not a substitute for judicial adjudication,
but a part of a system of industrial self-government"); Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial
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eral pronouncements of the Court from the Trilogy through Misco
regarding deferential review, courts on numerous occasions have
found legitimate bases for overturning arbitrators' awards, many
times on public-policy grounds. Many of these decisions are dis-
cussed below.
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
There are numerous cases from the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit that discuss the appropriate standard of
judicial review of arbitration awards. This section will examine
the leading First Circuit cases in this area. These cases can gener-
ally be separated into two categories: (1) cases that embrace the
standards propounded by the Trilogy and (2) cases that apply the
public-policy analyses used in W.R. Grace & Co. and Misco.
The First Circuit decision in Bettencourt v. Boston Edison
Co. 77 is one of its most influential restatements of the principles
set forth in the Trilogy and is often cited in the opinions issued by
that court.78 Bettencourt involved a challenge to an arbitrator's
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and
Around, 52 Mo. L. Rev. 243 (1987) (discussing the expanding judicial scrutiny of
arbitration decisions); Edgar A. Jones Jr., His Own Brand of Industrial Justice:
The Stalking Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 881
(1983) (arguing that the courts have disrupted bargaining relationships by their
willingness to override arbitrators' decisions); Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbi-
trators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 297-
98 (1980) ("It is to be hoped that judges will learn to temper their activist instincts
with an appreciation that the agreement before them is a unique type of contract,
and that an apparently erroneous award may in fact just reflect the creative search
for special rules that the parties need from their private judge, and for which they
have negotiated."); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 Mich. L. Rev.
1137, 1160-61 (1977) (stating that the arbitrator is the "reader" of parties' contract,
his award becomes part of their contract and therefore courts defer to the arbitra-
tor whose award should stand, absent procedural violations or illegality of result-
ing contract); Clyde W. Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 2 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1953) (considering the role of
courts in reviewing the merits of grievance, and finding that "courts have a func-
tion, but it is the limited one of exercising only enough supervision to prevent labor
arbitration from destroying itself").
77. 560 F.2d 1045 (1st Cir. 1977).
78. See, e.g., Wheelabrator Envirotech Operating Servs. Inc. v. Massachusetts
Laborers Dist. Council Local 1144, 88 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 1996); North Adams
Reg'l Hosp. v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 74 F.3d 346, 348 (1st Cir. 1996); Maine
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 873 F.2d 425,
428 (lst Cir. 1989); Local 1445, United Food and Commercial Workers Intl Union
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ruling that the termination of an employee was consistent with the
terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of the company.79
After citing the Trilogy and the general policies that weigh
against the judicial review of arbitrators' decisions, the First Cir-
cuit outlined a three-step test for determining whether an arbitra-
tor's decision evinced an "infidelity to his obligation to interpret
and apply the collective bargaining agreement." 0 The court
stated:
It may be that some of the arbitrator's findings and some
steps in his reasoning process are questionable .... But ap-
pellant has to show far more than that the case might have
come out the other way, or that there were gaps in the arbi-
trator's reasoning. At a minimum, he must establish that the
award is "unfounded in reason and fact," is based on reason-
ing "so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, could
ever conceivably have made such a ruling," or is mistakenly
based on a crucial assumption which is "concededly a non-
fact."8 '
The court, citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., concluded with an explicit rejection of a sub-
stantial evidence standard of review.8 2 The First Circuit has con-
tinued to apply the Bettencourt standard to disputes concerning
the reviewability of arbitration awards.8 3
The court of appeals nonetheless has been willing to overturn
arbitrators' decisions in a number of instances. For example, it
overturned an award where an arbitrator had clearly misinter-
preted unambiguous language in the collective bargaining agree-
v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1985); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston
Electrotypers Union No. 11, Int'l Printing and Graphic Communications Union,
702 F.2d 273, 281 (1st Cir. 1983).
79. See Bettencourt, 560 F.2d at 1048.
80. Id. at 1049 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
81. Id. at 1050 (citations omitted).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Wheelabrator Envirotech Operating Servs. Inc., 88 F.3d 40; Ad-
vest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990); Trustees of Boston Univ. v. Bos-
ton Univ. Chapter, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs., 746 F.2d 924 (1st Cir. 1984).
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ment.8 4 Any award which does not draw its essence from the
terms in the collective bargaining agreement will be subjected to
close scrutiny in the First Circuit." Nevertheless, while the "'con-
siderable deference due an arbitrator's decision 'does not grant
carte blanche approval to any decision that the arbitrator might
make,"'8 6 exceptions to the general rule against the review of arbi-
trators' awards are "few and far between."8 7
In 1992, the First Circuit refined the general rules set forth in
the Trilogy. In El Dorado Technical Services, Inc. v. Union Gen-
eral de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico,88 Judge Selya stated:
In labor arbitration, matters of contract interpretation are
typically for the arbitrator, not for a reviewing court. While
the arbitrator's award must draw its essence from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, it need not mirror a judge's notion
of how the agreement's language might best be interpreted or
might most fairly be applied to a given set of facts .... Put
succinctly, then, a court should uphold an award that de-
pends on an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement if it can find, within the four corners of the
agreement, any plausible basis for that interpretation.8 9
Clearly, in decisions like El Dorado and Bettencourt, the First Cir-
cuit adheres to the general rules set forth in the Trilogy, and the
notion that judicial review of arbitration awards should be gener-
ally limited to a narrow subset of circumstances so as not to reduce
the arbitral process to "an empty exercise."90 Notwithstanding the
Court's deferential approach to arbitral awards, however, the First
84. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
864 F.2d 940, 945 (1st Cir. 1988) (vacating an arbitrator's award "using reasoning
reminiscent of an Alice In Wonderland fantasy").
85. See, e.g., El Mundo Broading. Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 116
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1997).
86. Advest, Inc., 914 F.2d at 8 (quoting Challenger Carribean Corp. v. Union
General de Trabajadores, 903 F.2d 857, 861 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting International
Bhd. of Fireman and Oilers, Local 261 v. Great N. Paper Co., 765 F.2d 295, 296
(1st Cir. 1985))).
87. Id. (noting that proving that an arbitrator's award evidences a "manifest
disregard" of the law requires a showing that the arbitrator knew the pertinent
law and willfully chose not to apply it); see also id. at 10 (citing O.R. Secs., Inc. v.
Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988)).
88. 961 F.2d 317 (1st Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 319.
90. Id. at 320.
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Circuit has long recognized a public-policy exception to the general
standard-of-review rules set forth in the Trilogy.
The First Circuit's decision in United States Postal Service v.
American Postal Workers Union9 ' represents a clear statement of
the public-policy exception as it existed prior to Misco. 92 Postal
Workers involved a postal employee who was discharged from duty
for embezzling government funds. An arbitrator had ordered the
employee's reinstatement without back pay, and the postal service
sought to vacate the award as a violation of public policy.93
The court of appeals rejected the union's argument that a
judge could only vacate an arbitrator's award on policy grounds if
the policy had tangible roots in some form of direct legal prohibi-
tion.94 Judge Pettine, sitting by designation on the court of ap-
peals, held that such a close fit between the challenged award and
the public policy was not required to vacate an arbitral award.
Rather, the court held that an arbitration award may be vacated
when it violates a clearly defined public policy. Judge Pettine re-
lied on the positive law that created both professional and ethical
standards for all postal employees. 95 Drawing from theses sources,
Judge Pettine concluded:
[Wie cannot avoid the common sense implications that re-
quiring the rehiring of [the employee] would have on other
postal employees and on the public in general. Other postal
employees may feel there is less reason for them to be honest
than they believed - the Union could always fix it if they
were caught. Moreover, the public trust in the Postal Service,
and in the entire federal government, could be diminished by
the idea that graft is condoned. 96
In light of Misco, there may be some question about the contin-
uing vitality of the First Circuit's decision in Postal Workers.
Although Postal Workers does not undertake the Misco analysis
verbatim, it does appear to satisfy the standards enunciated in
Misco. It describes the well-defined and dominant public policy
91. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984) (Pettine, J., Senior District Judge of the Dis-
trict of Rhode Island, sitting by designation).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 824.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 825.
96. Id.
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against the embezzlement of public funds,9 7 and it accounts for the
law and legal precedents that define the scope of the postal em-
ployee's duties vis-A-vis her government employer.98
The First Circuit recently revisited the public-policy exception
to the general rule in Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc.99
Exxon demonstrates the continuing vitality of the public-policy ex-
ception, with a subtle variation on the Court's reasoning in
Misco.'00 Exxon involved a challenge to an arbitrator's award that
ordered reinstatement of a truck driver who was discharged for vi-
olating the company's drug policy. The driver's usual duties in-
volved transporting combustible materials on busy interstate
highways. 10 1 The company required all employees holding safety-
sensitive jobs to sign a statement acknowledging the company's
drug-free workplace policy. The employee in question had signed
the statement.10 2
The First Circuit vacated the arbitrator's award as a direct vi-
olation of the well-defined public policy "counseling against the
performance of safety-sensitive tasks by individuals who are [la-
boring under the influence of drugs]. " 1°3 The court, per Judge
Selya, reasoned that both decisional law and positive statutory law
provided substantial evidence of a policy against operating danger-
ous machinery while impaired.' 0 4 The court rejected the union's
argument that the arbitrator had not violated public policy in issu-
ing his award because it was uncertain whether the employee was
impaired by cocaine while discharging his duties. 10 5 The court
framed the policy in broad terms, noting that the public policy not
only encompassed the performance of safety-sensitive tasks, but
also included the employer's duty to implement and enforce drug-
free workplace programs.' 06
97. Id. at 825-26.
98. See id. (citing Local 453 Intl Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co.,
314 F.2d 25, 29 (1963)).
99. 118 F.3d 841 (1st Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 843, 844-45 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 42-43).
101. Id. at 843.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 848.
104. See id. at 846-47.
105. See id. at 849.
106. See id. at 851.
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The First Circuit's decision in Exxon invites a comparison to
Misco. Both cases involved the discharge of an employee for violat-
ing a company drug policy. Both cases also involved a public-policy
challenge to an arbitrator's award. In both cases, a United States
court of appeals held that an arbitrator's award directly contra-
vened a public policy. Only the definition of the public policy sepa-
rates the two cases. l0 7
By choosing to define the policy broadly, Exxon appears to
push the limits of the public-policy exception of Misco. Judge
Selya's opinion supports this proposition. Citing both Misco and
W.R. Grace & Co., his opinion stated:
Public policy, however, has its own imperatives - and they
occasionally conflict with the imperatives of contract inter-
pretation. It is a fundamental rule that courts must refrain
from enforcing contracts that violate public policy. Collective
bargaining agreements are simply a species of contracts and,
as such, are not immune from the operation of this rule. As
with any contract .... a court may not enforce a collective
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy. Be-
cause this refusal to enforce contracts which offend public pol-
icy is inured in judicial tradition, the question of what public
policy demands is within the judicial, not the arbitral,
domain. 08
While the First Circuit's approach restates the standard of ju-
dicial review announced in the Trilogy, it appears to take an ex-
pansive view of the public-policy exception. While the Supreme
Court in Misco deferred to the arbitrator's conclusions, the First
Circuit in Exxon vacated the arbitrator's ruling.10 9 Exxon may
represent a more aggressive approach in the First Circuit for ana-
lyzing the public policies which are affected by arbitrators'
decisions.
Exxon notes the existence of a "broad national consensus that
persons should not be allowed to endanger others while laboring
under the influence of drugs."110 Moreover, Exxon signals that the
essential question under Misco remains the definition and impor-
tance of the public policy at issue. It holds that this is a judicial,
107. Compare Misco, 484 U.S. at 42-44 (articulating a public-policy definition)
with Exxon, 118 F.3d at 847-49 (same).
108. Exxon, 118 F.3d at 844-45 (citations omitted).
109. See id. at 844, 846 & n.3, 849 & n.4.
110. Id. at 848.
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not an arbitral, function. So long as a court defines the policy
broadly enough, it follows that a reviewing court may vacate an
award regardless of the arbitrator's determinations of the merits.
3. The United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land has had comparatively fewer opportunities to address the
standard of judicial review of arbitration awards. Generally, the
court has applied the standard set forth in the Trilogy."'
In its most recent decision regarding a challenge to an arbitra-
tion award, the district court reaffirmed its adherence to the Tril-
ogy. In Larocque v. R.W.F., Inc.,112 the court quoted from both El
Dorado Technical Services and Misco, stating:
In labor arbitration, matters of contract interpretation are
typically for the arbitrator, not for a reviewing court. While
the arbitrator's award must draw its essence from [sic] the
collective bargaining agreement, it need not mirror a judge's
notion of how the agreement's language might best be inter-
preted or might most fairly be applied to a given set of facts.
So long as the arbitrator, acting within the scope of his dele-
gated authority, is arguably construing the contract, his deci-
sion must stand .... Put succinctly, then, a court should
uphold an award that depends on an arbitrator's interpreta-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement if it can find, within
the four corners of the agreement, any plausible basis for that
interpretation. 113
The court upheld the arbitrator's award, noting that the unfettered
judicial review of arbitrators' awards would gut the arbitration
111. See, e.g., Larocque v. R.W.F., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 386, 388 (D.R.I. 1992),
affd, 8 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 1993); Victor Elec. Wire and Cable Corp. v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2014, 411 F. Supp. 338, 340-43 (D.R.I. 1976), affd,
546 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1976); Master Sheet Metal Workers and Composition Roof-
ers Ass'n of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Local Union No. 17, 397 F. Supp. 1372, 1377-78,
1381 (D.R.I. 1975).
112. 793 F. Supp. 386.
113. Id. at 388 (citations omitted); see also supra note 89 and accompanying
text (quoting El Dorado).
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process and "render it meaningless." 1 4 Decisions prior to Laroc-
que also reflect a measured deference to arbitrators' decisions." 15
While it is apparent that the district court will not review an
award on its merits, it will vacate the award in that set of narrowly
defined circumstances listed in United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 116
B. Rhode Island Law
1. Statutory Law
An action brought in federal court to vacate an arbitration
award is typically brought under section 301 of the NLRA. In con-
trast, Rhode Island state courts have jurisdiction to review arbitra-
tion awards pursuant to statute. Section 28-9-18 of the Rhode
Island General Laws provides for this jurisdiction as follows:
Grounds for vacating award. - (a) In any of the following
cases the court must make an order vacating the award, upon
the application of any party to the controversy which was
arbitrated:
(1) When the award was procured by fraud.
(2) Where the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(3) If there was no valid submission or contract, and the
objection has been raised under the conditions set forth in
§ 28-9-13.
(b) motion to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator's
award shall not be entertained by the court unless the award
is first implemented by the party seeking its vacation, modifi-
cation, or correction; provided, however, the court, upon suffi-
cient cause shown, may order the stay of the award or any
part thereof upon circumstances and conditions which it may
prescribe.
114. Id. at 388.
115. See, e.g., Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. United Steelworkers
of Am., Local 9057, CIV.A. No. 89-0439B, 1990 WL 82813, at *3-4 (D.R.I. 1990)
(Hagopian, Mag.); Victor Elec., 411 F. Supp. at 340-342. Cf Master Sheet Metal
Workers, 397 F. Supp. 1378-79 (vacating partially an arbitrator's award that it
deemed an "utter and total disregard" of the collective bargaining agreement).
116. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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(c) If the motion to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitra-
tor's award is denied, the moving party shall pay the costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees of the prevailing party.1 17
Putting aside awards which are procured by fraud,' 1 8 the stat-
ute provides that "the court must make an order vacating the
award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which
was arbitrated: . . . (2) [wlhere the arbitrator or arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers."1 19
2. Decisional Law and the Standard of Review
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that courts must
accord arbitration awards substantial deference. 1 20 For example,
in Town of Coventry v. Turco, which is often cited by litigants as a
leading case in this area, the court expressed the view that the
authority to review arbitration awards is limited, and that the
courts should be deferential to arbitration as a contracted-for
method of dispute resolution:
It is well established that our judicial authority to vacate ar-
bitration awards is limited. Absent a manifest disregard of a
contractual provision or a completely irrational result, the
award will be upheld. Moreover, as long as an arbitrator's
award "'draws its essence' from the contract and is based
upon a 'passably plausible' interpretation of the contract, it is
within the arbitrator's authority and our review must
end."'121
This statement of policy echoed the court's earlier holding in
Jacinto v. Egan, in which the court stated:
The proper role for the courts in this regard is to determine
whether the arbitrator has resolved the grievance by consid-
ering the proper sources--"the contract and those circum-
stances out of which comes the 'common law of the shop'"-
117. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
118. Motions to vacate based on fraud are not discussed in this Article. The
basis is obvious, and clearly the proof of the fraud is key to any such motion.
119. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-18(a)(2); see, e.g., Town of Coventry v. Turco, 574
A.2d 143, 147 (R.I. 1990) (adding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and
vacating the award pursuant to § 28-9-18); State v. National Ass'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, Local 79, 544 A.2d 117, 119-20 (R.I. 1988) (same).
120. See, e.g., Turco, 574 A.2d at 147; Jacinto v. Egan, 391 A.2d 1173, 1175-76
(R.I. 1978).
121. Turco, 574 A.2d at 146 (citing Jacinto, 391 A.2d at 1176).
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but not to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved the
grievance correctly.122
Recently, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has shed
new light on the standard of review of arbitration awards and ar-
guably expanded the circumstances in which arbitration awards
may be overturned. 123 These cases signal a new era of judicial ex-
amination of arbitration awards in the public sector in Rhode Is-
land, and significantly restrict the ability of arbitrators to construe
public-sector contracts in a manner that is inconsistent with statu-
tory law, the parties' collective bargaining agreement or public pol-
icy. Further, these cases make clear that courts must not tolerate
the use of past practices as a basis for an arbitration award that is
either inconsistent with law, public policy or the explicit terms of
the parties' labor contract.
The court now has made clear that deferential review will only
be accorded to decisions that are clearly arbitrable and in which
the arbitrator has legitimately exercised his or her powers. In
RIBCO, the court noted that it will not apply a "circumscribed
standard of review" and will vacate an award where, for example,
the issue determined by the arbitrator was not arbitrable in the
first place, or if the arbitrator "exceeded his or her powers."1 24
Most significantly, the RIBCO court held that, in cases where an
arbitrator has adjudicated a non-arbitrable issue or has exceeded
his or her powers, the court will decide the issue de novo, and will
apply a heightened level of review. 125 The court explained that
"[olur heightened level of review in such cases is predicated on the
possibility that an arbitrator might be called upon to consider and
to interpret a [collective bargaining agreement] in such a way that
it would alter existing statutory policies or override other super-
vening state law governing the public-employment sector."126 Ac-
122. Jacinto, 391 A.2d at 1176 (citing Robert A. Gorman, Labor Law 585 (1976)
(quoting Safeway Stores v. American Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int'l
Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968))).
123. See Town of Smithfield v. Local 2050, No. 96-255, 1998 WL 61142 (R.I.
Feb. 12, 1998) (hereinafter Town of Smithfield); Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional
Officers v. State, No. 96-240, 1998 WL 45284 (R.I. Jan. 15, 1998) (hereinafter
RIBCO); Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps. v. Rhode Island
Council 94, 694 A.2d 318 (R.I. 1997) (hereinafter MHRH).
124. RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *5 (citing Turco, 574 A.2d at 146) (quoting
Jacinto v. Egan, 120 A.2d 907, 912 (R.I. 1978)).
125, Id.
126. Id.
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cording to the RIBCO court, an arbitrator exceeds his or her
powers when the award does not "draw its essence" from the con-
tract, or is not based on a "passably plausible" interpretation
thereof.127 In such cases, the court may conclude that "the arbitra-
tor manifestly disregarded a contractual provision or reached an
irrational result and thereby exceeded his or her authority."128 In
addition, an arbitrator may exceed his or her powers where he or
she interprets a collective bargaining agreement "in such a way
that it contravenes state law or other public policies that are not
subject to alteration by arbitration."129
Thus, it appears that the court after RIBCO will apply a
heightened standard of review to any case in which the arbitrator
has exceeded his or her powers in one of the following ways: (1) the
award evinces a manifest disregard for the parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement; 130 (2) the award is contrary to public policy;1 3 '
(3) the award is in manifest disregard of the law;13 2 (4) the award
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Turco, 574 A.2d at 146 (quoting Jacinto, 120 A.2d at 1176)).
129. Id. (citing MHRH, 692 A.2d at 322; Vose v. Rhode Island Bhd. of Correc-
tional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I. 1991)).
130. See Turco, 574 A.2d at 147.
131. See MHRH, 692 A.2d at 322.
132. Prior to RIBCO, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had not considered
manifest disregard of the law as a specific basis for overturning a labor arbitration
award. MHRH and RIBCO, however, read together appear to set forth clearly
manifest disregard of the law as a basis for vacating an arbitration award. This
conclusion is consistent with several recent cases involving arbitration awards con-
sidered under statutory language identical to that found in § 28-9-18. See, e.g.,
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Nault, 701 A.2d 320, 323 (R.I. 1997) (considering language in
§ 10-3-12(4) of the Rhode Island General Laws which exactly tracks the language
of § 28-9-18) ("A manifest disregard of the law, although not specifically provided
for in the statute, has also been recognized as grounds for vacating an arbitration
award.") (citing Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG, Inc., 376 A.2d 708, 711 (1977)).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court will have another opportunity to address this
issue directly when it considers the appeal of Justice Silverstein's decision in
RIASSE, Local 580 v. State, (No. xx-xxx (R.I. Super. Ct. xxxx), appeal docketed,
No. 97-4329 (R.I. xxxx) (vacating an arbitration award holding that sick time may
be counted as "hours worked" for purposes of computing overtime in direct contra-
vention of § 36-4-63 of the Rhode Island General Laws)
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is irrationa 133 and/or (5) the arbitrator has decided a non-arbitra-
ble issue.' 34
a. Manifest Disregard of the Specific Terms of the Parties'
Labor Contract
Perhaps the most obvious basis for overturning an award is
also, in some ways, the most controversial. Courts have for many
years recognized that arbitrators are given the power to interpret
the parties' collective bargaining agreements and are creatures of
the contract. This fundamental notion was at the heart of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in the Trilogy. The
words of Justice Douglas, oft-repeated, carry great weight:
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of
situations.... Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to in-
terpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of in-
dustrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this ob-
ligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of
the award.' 3 5
Justice Douglas's statement of the law commences with the ca-
veat that the "refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitra-
tion award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements."136 While the opinion clearly does not
foreclose all forms of judicial review of arbitration awards, "[tihis
133. See Jacinto, 391 A.2d at 1176; Rhode Island Council 94 v. State, No. 96-
0307 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 31, 1996) (Israel, J.), appeal argued (R.I. April 7, 1998)
(holding that an arbitration award finding Adult Correctional Institution inmates
on work detail to be "employees" for purposes of the CBA is irrational). This case is
pending before the Supreme Court; oral argument was held on April 7, 1998.
134. See RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *5; MHRH, 692 A.2d at 323.
135. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960); see also Jacinto, 391 A.2d at 1175 ("Ihe judicial branch must not
overlook the fact that an arbitration award is the decision of an extra-judicial tri-
bunal which the parties themselves have created .... ").
136. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596. "When an arbitrator is
commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to
bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem.
This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies." Id. at 597.
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statement does suggest a high degree of receptivity to the conclu-
siveness of an award." 137
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the need for
a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award where the arbi-
trator goes beyond the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The court's decision in Town of Coventry v. Turco is the
leading case on this point. Thus, in Turco, the court considered an
arbitration award which included a police officer's 120-day accu-
mulated sick pay in his base pay for pension calculation purposes,
where the contract did not so provide. In this case, the parties'
pension article was silent as to which benefits should be included
in base pay for pension purposes. The parties agreed, however, in
spite of the contract's silence, that certain sick payments made to
an officer during the year were included in base pay. Based on this
agreement, the arbitrator ruled that accumulated sick leave
should also be included even though it was accumulated over many
years and paid out at retirement. The court held that the award
manifestly disregarded the contractual provisions, and achieved
"an irrational result" because the award essentially rewrote the
contract. 138
The court noted a willingness to forsake the "public policy that
favors the final resolution of disputes ... by arbitration" when ar-
bitrators act outside of the scope of their power and authority.139
While this dicta gives a nod to Justice Douglas's opinion in Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., it clearly endorses the proposition that an
arbitrator is confined to a reasonable interpretation of the contract
he or she interprets. The holding of Turco-that arbitration
awards which evidence an infidelity to the agreement that the par-
137. Jonathan Yarowsky, Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determina-
tions: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 936, 954
(1976); see also Bernard Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va. L.
Rev. 427, 427 (1969) (stating that "[a] collective bargaining agreement typically
provides that an arbitration award shall be 'final and binding'... . land] conclusive-
ness is expected, for the essence of the arbitration process is that the arbitrator's
decision shall put the dispute to rest").
138. Turco, 574 A.2d at 147 (concluding that the arbitrator's decision to disre-
gard the contract achieved an irrational result).
139. Id. But see id. at 148 (Kelleher, J., dissenting) ("This court has stated that
'judicial reversal of an arbitrator's award solely on the ground of a reviewing
court's disagreement with his construction of the contract is prohibited.'") (citing
Council 94, Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. State, 475 A.2d
200. 203 (R.I. 1984)).
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ties negotiated are subject to judicial review and must be va-
cated14 0-has been recently reaffirmed by the court in RIBCO.
b. Awards That Are Contrary to Public Policy
The United States Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have explicitly recognized a
public-policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration
awards. 141 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has at least implic-
itly recognized a court's right to vacate an arbitration award that
is contrary to public policy. In Rhode Island, Vose v. Brotherhood
of Correctional Officers142 is the seminal case on this issue.
Vose involved a dispute over the arbitrability of a labor agree-
ment which specifically prohibited the Director of the Department
of Corrections (DOC) from mandating overtime. DOC, because of a
lack of sufficient volunteers for available overtime, mandated that
correctional officers perform overtime. This was a direct violation
of the labor agreement. The union filed a grievance and proceeded
to arbitration. DOC sought an injunction against the arbitration.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the Director of DOC
had a statutory obligation to provide safety, discipline and care to
the inmates and to the public. Hence, any agreement which lim-
ited this statutory obligation was void and unenforceable. 143
The court did not use the term "public policy" in its decision in
Vose. However, it is clear that the court was referring to an impor-
tant public policy in its decision. The court confirmed this view in
RIBCO where it stated that one of the ways in which an arbitrator
may exceed his or her powers is "by interpreting a CBA in such a
way that it contravenes state law or other public policies."144 It
140. This proposition is also a fundamental principal of arbitral law. See
Elkouri supra note 1, at 482-83. Elkouri notes:
If the language of an agreement is clear and unequivocal, an arbitrator
generally will not give it a meaning other than that expressed. . . . As
Arbitrator Fred Whitney has stated, an arbitrator cannot "ignore clear-
cut contractual language," and "may not legislate new language, since to
do so would usurp the role of the labor organization and employer."
Id. (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29
(1987).
142. 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991).
143. Id. at 916.
144, RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *5 (emphasis added) (citing MHRH, 692 A.2d
at 322).
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seems clear under these cases that the court recognizes statutes as
clear expressions of public policy. Where, as in Vose, an arbitra-
tion award concludes that the collective bargaining agreement re-
quires conduct that repudiates or requires a party to act in
violation of a statutory obligation, the court will vacate the
award. 145
In the recent MHRH decision, the court confronted an issue
similar to the issue encountered in Vose. In MHRH, the issue was
whether the Department of Mental Health & Retardation and Hos-
pitals could impose limits on the number of consecutive work shifts
for nurses where the collective bargaining agreement permitted
multiple consecutive shifts. The arbitrator held that the imposi-
tion of such limits violated the contract. The court held that the
department was not required to arbitrate before it could take steps
to insure the quality of the healthcare provided to the agency's pa-
tients. 146 In the court's words, "when it comes to its statutory duty
of looking after these disabled patients, the state should not have
been required to arbitrate whether it should take nine stitches in
time to save it from taking one."147 While the decision turned on
the arbitrability of the dispute, as did Vose, the case is an impor-
tant indicator of the court's willingness to examine carefully the
public-policy implications of a decision in reviewing a labor arbi-
tration award, even to the point of reviewing such an award de
novo to determine whether the issue was arbitrable in the first
place.
It is very clear that the court will not allow arbitration awards
which violate clear statutory provisions, or which require conduct
that contravenes clear statutory mandates, to stand. What is not
clear, however, based on a review of the cases to date, is whether
the court will treat cases which violate public policies not clearly
expressed in statutory law in a similar fashion. Reading Vose and
MHRH together with RIBCO, it is reasonable to conclude that the
court will apply the same strict standard of review to broader pub-
lic-policy considerations such as the First Circuit did in Exxon,
145, With regard to the particular policy at issue in Vose, the court stated that,
"due to the exigencies incident to running a correctional institution, we could not
fathom a result that would leave the director unable to provide for adequate secur-
ity, regardless of whether an emergency is deemed to be present." Vose, 587 A.2d
at 915-16.
146. MHRH, 692 A.2d at 325.
147. Id.
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which are not necessarily expressed in statutes that are directly on
point.148 Moreover, this would be a natural extension of the court's
holdings in these cases. The public policies of a community or a
state are expressed in the statutory and case law of the commu-
nity, as well as other, less tangible sources, which courts are
clearly capable of assessing. An arbitration award in violation of
public policy should not be allowed to stand, so long as the policy is
well-defined, dominant and identifiable by reference to proper
sources, such as statutory or case law. Given the appropriate set of
facts, it seems likely that the court will continue to vacate awards
in these circumstances.
c. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Closely related to the issue of public policy as grounds for va-
cating an arbitration award are cases where an arbitrator has re-
fused or failed to apply applicable external law. An arbitrator
must be faithful not only to the contract which he or she interprets,
but also to the law. This is particularly true in the public-sector
context. Numerous cases from a variety of jurisdictions have held
that an arbitrator must apply and be faithful to external law when
interpreting a labor contract. 149 Several courts have considered
148. It is notable that in RIBCO, one of the State's primary arguments was
that the practice affirmed by the arbitrator-full/block time leave for union of-
ficers-was a violation of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 28-7-13(3)(iii), which makes payments by employers to unions an unfair
labor practice. The court declined to address this issue, holding instead that the
arbitrator's award, inasmuch as it was predicated upon a past practice, was unen-
forceable under Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376 (R.I.
1991). RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *6.
149. See, e.g., Lodge 2424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
United States, 564 F.2d 66, 71 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (overturning an arbitrator's decision
where the arbitrator ignored the laws and regulations which were an integral part
of the agreement and which equally bounded the parties); Board of Educ. v. Yon-
kers Fed'n of Teachers, 385 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (N.Y. 1978) ("Arbitration awards
are always limited by the interdictions of public policy as expressed in the Consti-
tution, statutes or decisional law of the State."); see also, e.g., Niagara Wheat Field
Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheat Field Cent. Sch. Dist., 375 N.E.2d 37, 40 (N.Y.
1978) ("rThe freedom of a public employer to contract with an employee organiza-
tion, although broad, is not wholly unrestrained. Any provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement which contravenes public policy, statute or decisional law may
not stand and an arbitration award effectuating such a provision is vulnerable to
attack .... A public employer may not, through a collective bargaining agreement,
jeopardize its effectiveness by relinquishing control of essential facets of its opera-
tion.") (citations omitted).
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the issue directly in reviewing labor arbitration awards. For exam-
ple, one court stated that "lilt is elementary that parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement cannot bargain for provisions that are
contrary to the law." 150 Moreover, "[allthough the arbitrator is
free to make an award consonant with the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement, he must not issue awards that conflict with
'external law' such as federal statutes and regulations."151 While
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not directly confronted this
issue in the context of a review of a labor arbitration award under
section 28-9-18, it is clear from the reading of several recent cases
that the court considers manifest disregard of the law grounds for
vacating an award.
The court has refused to overturn an arbitrator's award where
the award was based upon a "mere mistake of law" that did not
rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law. The court ex-
plains: "Manifest disregard of the law must be something beyond
and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of
the arbitrators to understand or apply the law .... [A] manifest
disregard of the law.. . might be present when arbitrators under-
stand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the
same.' 52
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's recent decision in Peerless
Insurance Co. v. Nault 5 3 considered language in section 10-3-12 of
the Rhode Island General Laws' 5 4 which exactly tracks the lan-
guage of section 28-9-18. The court's opinion made clear that man-
150. Devine v. Brisco, 733 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Graphic Arts
Intl Union, Local No. 280 v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
party cannot lawfully demand an illegal contractual provision); Thompson v.
Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp. 1035 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that a school dis-
trict's policies violated federal and state statutes).
151. Brisco, 733 F.2d at 872; Devine v. Nutt, 718 F.2d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 648 (1985) ("Judicial deference to an arbi-
tral award may be inappropriate when the award is in apparent conflict with a
federal statute that is distinct from the operation of the collective bargaining
agreement.")
152. Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708, 711 (R.I.
1977) (alteration in original); see also Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1990) (stating that manifest disregard of the law is grounds for vacating an arbi-
tral award where the arbitrator knew the law and willfully chose to ignore it).
153. 701 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1997).
154. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (providing the general guidelines and pro-
cedures of Rhode Island's general Arbitration Act). For a treatment on labor arbi-
tration, see §§ 29-9-1 to -26 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
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ifest disregard of the law is grounds for vacating an award.
Quoting language from a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court stated that "[a] manifest
disregard of the law, although not specifically provided for in the
statute, has also been recognized as grounds for vacating an arbi-
tration award."155
In MHRH 5 6 and Vose, 157 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the State may not contract away its statutory obliga-
tions. In Vose, the court wrote:
[Like a judge sitting without a jury, an arbitrator is called
upon not only to make findings of fact but also to apply the
law to the facts. In applying the law, the arbitrator will nec-
essarily be called upon to make rulings concerning the appli-
cable law and to interpret the law according to the facts
before him or her.... With that said, we do agree with the
director that the instant issue is not arbitrable .... What
makes this case properly justiciable is that there is a conflict
between this statute and the [labor contract] .... [Tihe collec-
tive bargaining agreement shall not be interpreted as re-
stricting the director's statutory power to order mandatory
involuntary overtime.158
155. Peerless Ins. Co., 701 A.2d at 323 (quoting Westminster Constr. Corp., 376
A.2d at 711). Other recent cases on the federal level suggest a limitation to this
doctrine, one which has some common-sense appeal-in order for an arbitration
award to be overturned because it manifestly disregards the law, it must be shown
that the arbitrator knew the law and disregarded it. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (2nd Cir. 1997) (finding that the arbitra-
tor did not manifestly disregard the law in failing to award attorney fees to a pre-
vailing party under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, where the party
did not submit to the arbitrator the provision from the Act which required an
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party).
156. 692 A.2d 318 (R.I. 1997).
157. 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991); see also Westminster Constr. Corp., 376 A.2d at
711. These two cases are also discussed in detail in the public-policy section,
supra, section II.B.3.
158. Vose, 587 A.2d at 914-16 (citing Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895
(R.I. 1990)) (footnotes and additional citations omitted). Accordingly, a contract
which calls for a violation of state law cannot be upheld by an arbitrator. To this
end, the court stated: "An arbitrator sits as an alternative to a judicial forum for
the purpose of resolving a dispute .... In applying the law, the arbitrator will
necessarily be called upon to make rulings concerning the applicable law and to
interpret the law according to the facts before him or her." Id. at 914. It is a basic
principle of contract law that contracts which are in contravention of a state stat-
ute are illegal, and therefore, no contractual rights can be created or enforced. See
Birkett v. Chatterton, 13 R.I. 299, 302 (1881).
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In addition, in RIBCO, the court indicated that an arbitrator
exceeds his or her powers by interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement in a way that "contravenes state law" or other public
policies not subject to alteration by arbitration. Each of these
cases indicates the court's apparent willingness to overturn arbi-
tration awards which directly contravene or fail to apply statutory
law. Read in conjunction with Peerless Insurance Co., these cases
support the inescapable conclusion that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court considers manifest disregard of the law to be grounds for
vacating an arbitration award. At least one case currently pending
before the Rhode Island Superior Court may give the court the op-
portunity to consider "manifest disregard of the contract" in the
labor-arbitration context.15 9
d. Irrationality
Until recently, the concept of an "irrational" arbitration award
was difficult to define. Courts had frequently referred to irration-
ality as a basis for overturning an award, but rarely used it as an
exclusive basis for a decision to overturn an award. More typically,
the court would address the issue of whether an arbitrator ex-
ceeded his or her authority in the context of the failure to follow
the explicit terms of the collective bargaining agreement, such as
in Turco, or the issuance of an award that requires the party to
engage in conduct which violates its statutory obligations, such as
in MHRH.
However, in the recent case of Town of Smithfield v. Local
2050,160 the court directly addressed the issue of irrationality in
the context of the review of an arbitration award. 161 In Town of
Smithfield, the court considered a decision by an arbitrator to al-
low union officials to be paid for time spent in collective-bargaining
159. In State v. RIASSE, Local 580, No. xx-xxx (R.I. Super Ct. xxxx), appeal
docketed, No. 97-4329 (R.I. xxxx), the superior court vacated an award of an arbi-
trator, holding that a policy memorandum which allows certain state employees to
count sick leave as hours worked for overtime computation purposes, in direct con-
travention of a state statute (and the collective bargaining agreement's explicit
terms), must be enforced in spite of the statute. This case has been appealed by
the union to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, see also supra note 132, and it will
present an opportunity for the court to confront the issue in the labor-arbitration
context.
160. No. 96-225, 1998 WL 61142 (R.I. Feb. 12, 1998).
161. See id.
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negotiations with their employer. 162 The arbitrator relied on the
past practices of the parties in reaching his conclusion. 163 The
court, relying on its decision in Rhode Island Court Reporters Alli-
ance v. State,'64 held that the parties did not meet the test for a
valid past practice, and therefore the issue decided by the arbitra-
tor was "not an arbitrable issue."165 After holding that the arbitra-
tor's award did not meet the requirements of Court Reporters, the
court went on to discuss the evidence presented to the arbitrator
and concluded that the arbitrator's decision was, in fact, "irra-
tional." 66 The court appeared struck by the lack of credible evi-
dence put before the arbitrator to support the union's argument
that the town of Smithfield was aware of the practice which it had
allegedly ratified by its conduct. 167 The court expressed further
amazement that the arbitrator concluded from such a barren rec-
ord that the town must have known of the practice and failed to
repudiate it.168 As a result, the court found this to be a "irrational
conclusion" which found no support in any of the evidence put
before the arbitrator. 169 The court further found that the arbitra-
tor's rejection of evidence that the town had rejected the practice as
irrelevant lacked any rational basis and that "[sluch a conclusion
defies reason."170 The court noted that the trial court was mis-
taken in believing that there had to be a "showing of bias, corrup-
tion or mental incompetence on the part of the arbitrator" in order
for the arbitrator's decision not to be "passably plausible." Relying
on Westcott Construction Corp. v. City of Cranston,171 the court
noted that it had previously implied that an arbitrator's award
which was not "passably plausible" is necessarily "irrational." 72
The holding in Town of Smithfield is important for several rea-
sons. First, it somewhat clarifies the definition for irrationality as
a basis for vacating an arbitration award. It sets out the irration-
162. Id.
163. See id. at *1.
164. 591 A.2d 376 (R.I. 1991).





170. Id. at *4.
171. 586 A.2d 542 (R.I. 1991).
172. Town of Smithfield, 1998 WL 61142, at *4 (quoting Westcott Constr. Corp.,
586 A.2d at 543).
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ality standard as the absence of a "passably plausible" interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement's terms. 173 Second, it
clears the way for the superior court, in reviewing an arbitrator's
award, to examine the evidence upon which the arbitrator relied in
reaching his or her conclusion.174 Thus, it is not just the conclu-
sion which is subject to review by the court, but the evidence which
the arbitrator considered in order to reach the conclusion. This is
important because some superior court judges have been reluctant
to dig too deeply into the reasoning behind the arbitrator's award
on motions to vacate. Under Town of Smithfield, however, it ap-
pears that the superior court is not only permitted, but is required
to examine the nature and weight of the evidence upon which the
arbitrator relied for his or her decision when confronting the ques-
tion of whether the award is in fact a "passably plausible" interpre-
tation of the agreement.
The supreme court currently has before it a case which may
allow for further clarification of irrationality as a basis for over-
turning an arbitration award. In Rhode Island Council 94 v.
State,175 the court will consider the question of whether an arbitra-
tor's conclusion that prisoners, working at various state facilities
performing menial labor, should be considered "employees" for pur-
poses of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The superior
court held that such a conclusion was irrational stating that "this
court concludes that no reasonably literate person would seriously
choose the word 'employee' in the English language to describe the
status of three-dollar-per-day prisoners laboring involuntarily for
the state."176
e. Arbitability and the Rejection of "Past Practices"
MHRH, RIBCO and Town of Smithfield signal a dramatic new
direction of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in reviewing motions
to vacate arbitration awards. First, these cases, taken as a whole,
dramatically narrow the kinds of disputes which are arbitable
under public-sector collective bargaining agreements in Rhode Is-
land. Second, these cases hold that the standard of review applica-
173. Id.
174. See id. at *3.
175. No. 96-0558, appeal argued (R.I. April 7, 1998).
176. Rhode Island Council 94, C.A. No. PC-96-0307 (Israel, J.) (R.I. Super. Ct.
July 31, 1996).
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ble to arbitration awards which consider issues beyond the four
comers of collective bargaining agreements is a "heightened stan-
dard of review'-not a deferential one. Third, these decisions, in
particular MHRH and RIBCO, make clear that arbitability is the
equivalent of subject matter jurisdiction, and can be raised by the
parties or the court at any time during the proceedings, and may
not be waived. 177
In these cases, the court has dramatically narrowed the types
of issues which may be submitted to arbitration by virtually elimi-
nating the ability of a union, or an employer, to bring a grievance
based solely upon the existence of a "past practice" between the
parties which the grieving party claims created a legally binding
right. This issue was first addressed by the court in Rhode Island
Court Reporters Alliance v. State.178 In Court Reporters, the court
specifically addressed the issue of past practice and held that, in
order for there to be a legally binding past practice: "the contract
must contain a past practice provision or savings clause that evi-
dences the mutual intent of the parties to establish these benefits
as enforceable past practices. Otherwise, these past practices can-
not serve as the basis for arbitration."179 The court set forth five
specific criteria that must be met before it would find a "mutual
intent" between the parties to adopt a past practice as a binding
agreement. There must be: "(1) clarity and consistency through-
out the course of conduct, (2) longevity and repetition creating a
consistent pattern of behavior, (3) acceptance of the practice by
both parties, (4) mutuality in the inception or applications of the
practice, and (5) consideration of the underlying circumstances giv-
ing rise to the practice."'8 °
In MHRH, RIBCO and Town of Smithfield, the court applied a
restrictive interpretation of Court Reporters. In MHRH, the con-
tract contained a past-practice clause which provided that,
"[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided... , all privileges and
benefits which employees have hitherto enjoyed shall be main-
tained and continued by the state during the term of this agree-
177. See, e.g., RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *5 (discussing how the use of arbitra-
tion as a vehicle to hear grievances is equivalent to subject matter jurisdiction in
courts).
178. 591 A.2d 376 (R.I. 1991).
179. Id. at 378.
180. Id. at 379.
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ment."181 In RIBCO, the court considered a nearly identical
"privileges and benefits" clause. The RIBCO court stated that such
a clause does not indicate the parties' intent to establish a particu-
lar practice as a contractually protected benefit or privilege merely
because it is a practice of the parties. The court stated:
Indeed, the CBA makes no mention whatsoever of past prac-
tices serving as the basis for an arbitable grievance. Here, as
in the Court Reporters case, "we must limit our analysis to
the four corners of the instrument." Because past practices
are not specified in the CBA as contractually protected "bene-
fits and privileges," we hold, as we did in the Court Reporters
case, that a grievance pertaining to alleged past practices is
not arbitable absent a specific CBA provision evidencing the
mutual intent of the parties to bind themselves to such prac-
tices and identifying the specific past practices that are to be
enforceable in this manner. Without such a provision DOC's
past approval of requests for paid full-time union leave was a
mere administrative policy that could be changed, like any
other governmental policy, whenever the appropriate govern-
ment authorities chose to do so. 18 2
Further, if a practice contravenes another specific provision of the
collective bargaining agreement, then it must be "in writing and
signed by the parties to be binding" where the collective bargaining
agreement requires that any alteration or modification of the
agreement must be executed in writing.'83
The RIBCO court also made an additional important holding
regarding the use of past practice in public-sector labor law. The
court held that, even if the collective bargaining agreement had
contained a binding past-practice clause-which according to the
court it did not-and if the actions of the state could have satisfied
all five criteria in Court Reporters, then "[wihen the underlying cir-
cumstances supporting a binding practice change, there is good
reason to conclude that the practice itself, being 'no broader than
181. MHRH, 692 A.2d at 320 n.6.
182. RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *6 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Town of
Smithfield, the court held that a generalized reference to past practices contained
in the management-rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement failed to
meet the requirements of Court Reporters. Town of Smithfield, 1998 WL 61142, at
*3.
183. RIBCO, 1998 WL 45284, at *7.
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the circumstances from which it arises' may also change."18 4 The
court held that a past practice initiated by one administration "is
subject to change when a new Governor is elected and takes steps
within a reasonable time to carry out his or her reserved manage-
ment prerogatives."18 5 Finally, the court appeared to direct arbi-
trators to ensure that, in addition to the above practice, a party
entering into the alleged agreement supported by past practices
must have the actual authority to enter into the agreement. In
this case, the court held that the department director did not have
sufficient authority to make such an agreement and that the arbi-
tration award should have been vacated on this ground alone.' 86
By virtue of the court's holdings in these cases, it is difficult to
imagine an arbitrator's award based on past practice that could
survive challenge. Arguably, only grievances which raise issues
specifically covered by specific terms of the collective bargaining
agreement are arbitable in the first instance. To the extent that
such a grievance is based upon or supported by a past practice in
order to be arbitable, the grieving party, typically the union, would
need to prove four elements. First, the contract must contain a
past-practices provision sufficient to meet the requirements of
Court Reporters and RIBCO-such a clause must list those prac-
tices which the parties intend to be bound by, thus including them
within the four corners of the agreement. Second, the practice
must meet the five criteria set forth in Court Reporters. Third, the
grieving party must show that the persons who made the agree-
ment had the actual authority to contract on behalf of their respec-
tive parties to the collective bargaining agreement. Fourth, the
practice has not been repudiated by a new administration or execu-
tive or by a change in circumstances. This fourfold burden would
appear very difficult to meet, thus restricting the parties to griev-
ances which are brought under and which interpret the explicit
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental holdings of the Trilogy continue to set the
standard of review for cases brought in the federal courts. How-
184. Id. at *7 (citing Court Reporters, 591 A.2d at 379) (quoting National
Broadcasting Co. 67 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 989, 992 (1976)).
185. Id. at *8.
186. See id. at *8.
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ever, it is probable that the First Circuit and the Rhode Island fed-
eral district court will continue to scrutinize awards which violate
clearly identifiable public policies carefully. In the federal courts,
challenges to arbitration awards will likely remain the exception
and not the rule.
In the area of public-sector labor law in Rhode Island, the field
has changed rapidly over the last two years and is still evolving.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has sent a clear message in its
recent cases that arbitrators are not free to ignore the obligations
imposed by statute upon public agencies when interpreting collec-
tive bargaining agreements; that arbitration awards which ignore
or play loose with the explicit terms of a collective bargaining
agreement or the law, or which are not based on a passably plausi-
ble interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and are
irrational, will be subjected to a "heightened" scrutiny and de novo
review by the courts; and that arbitrators should consider only
those grievances which are brought under specific and explicit
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and may not reach
beyond the parties' agreement to consider issues of "past practice"
unless all of the standards set forth in Court Reporters, as refined
in RIBCO and Town of Smithfield, are met.
These holdings of the supreme court are seen by many in or-
ganized labor as a frontal assault by the court on public-sector un-
ions in Rhode Island. Public-sector unions may respond to these
recent decisions by seeking legislation from the General Assembly
to "correct" these recent rulings of the court. Some in organized
labor believe that the court has rejected the fundamental holding
of the Trilogy that courts should give some deference to arbitration
awards. It is this author's view that this extreme view is incorrect.
While the court's recent decisions do reflect a more rigorous stan-
dard of review, they by no means signal the demise of labor arbi-
tration as the preferred method of dispute resolution in the labor
field. A legislative "correction," therefore, would be a serious mis-
take and should invite a gubernatorial veto. Lawyers who practice
in this area and have argued these cases before the superior courts
and the supreme court know that judges are loathe to upset an
award of an arbitrator unless the circumstances truly call for it. If
public-sector employers and their unions exercise restraint and
common sense in collective bargaining and utilize the grievance ar-
bitration process for the resolution of legitimate contract interpre-
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tation issues, then fewer arbitration awards would be subject to
review and vacation by the courts. This solution, which is pre-
mised on common sense and good judgment of labor and manage-
ment professionals, as opposed to a legislative "cure," is the
preferable course for the future.
These recent decisions of the supreme court do not signal the
end of labor arbitration as we know it. Rather, the fundamental
principal of the Trilogy is alive and well in public-sector labor law
in Rhode Island, and arbitration is still the preferred method of
resolving disputed issues between unions and their employers in
the public sector. The reasons for judicial deference to awards of
an arbitrator, first stated in the Trilogy, are many and are still
sound. First, a labor arbitrator sits as a judge for the case he or
she has been selected to hear. The parties have contracted for this
method of resolving their disagreements as to the interpretation of
the contract. Typically, the collective bargaining agreement in is-
sue specifies the types of grievances which are arbitable, the proce-
dures for the arbitration and, in most cases, the fact that the
award should be "final and binding" upon the parties as an inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the arbi-
trator is imbued with authority from both parties to act as the
neutral interpreter of contractual provisions which they disagree
upon. Courts should generally be reluctant to interfere with this
contracted-for method of dispute resolution.
Second, the holding of an arbitrator is generally only applica-
ble to the facts of the specific case. Arbitration awards do not carry
the precedential value of court decisions, and the doctrine of stare
decises does not generally apply in arbitral law. Moreover, a hold-
ing by an arbitrator that is disappointing to one party may be ad-
dressed by that party in subsequent contract negotiations.
Because labor contracts are typically of a relatively short dura-
tion-generally not more than three years-the parties have an
opportunity within a fairly short period of time to reform their con-
tracts to address arbitration decisions with which they disagree
during the contract term. In addition, because arbitration is only
one component of the typical grievance-resolution process, it is im-
portant that the parties understand that the holdings of arbitra-
tors are indeed binding upon them and not simply an intermediate
step on the way to the courthouse. Thus, many grievances are re-
solved short of arbitration as part of a grievance process which is,
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in effect, part of the continuing bargaining process between the
employer and the union.
Finally, arbitration generally, and particularly in the labor
field, is meant to provide a swift resolution of disputes between the
parties. Resort to the courts obviously delays final resolution of
disputes, thereby potentially undermining the continuing collec-
tive bargaining relationship between the employer and the union.
In the wake of the recent holdings of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, it is clear that both labor and management in the
public sector need to work together to clarify their collective bar-
gaining agreements, and to ensure, first, that the practices which
they wish to be bound by are codified into their agreements and,
second, that the laws and public policies which govern the parties
are followed and reflected in the collective bargaining agreements
between public-sector employers and their unions. If this is accom-
plished, then judicial deference will once again be the norm, and
arbitration will thrive without interference from the courts.
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